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No. 93-5777 and 93-5794 
                
 
 
CHEMICAL LEAMAN TANK LINES, INC. 
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THE AETNA CASUALTY AND SURETY COMPANY; 
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subscribing to Insurance Policies Numbers Numbers 
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C65P 5-119, C65P 5-119A, L65P 5-119A, L66P 5-119A, 
C67P 4-158, L67P 4-158, C68P 2-116, L68P 2-116, 
C68P 2-116A, C68P 2-116B, L68P 2-116A, L68P 2-116B, 
C71-03-03-13, L71-03-03-13, C71-03-03-13A, 
C71-03-03-13B, L71-03-03-13A, L71-03-03-13B, 
C74-03-18-02, 77-01-19-23, 77-01-19-23A, C77-01-19-23B, 
79-04-19-10, C80-02-19-09, C80-02-19-09B, L80-02-09A, 
L80-02-19-09A, L80-02-19-09B, C83-02-19-09, 
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      ROBIN ANTHONY GILDART JACKSON, an Underwriter at Lloyds, 
London, individually and in his capacity as representative 
Underwriter at Lloyds, London for certain subscribing 
Underwriters at Lloyds, London who subscribed to certain 
liability insurance policies issued to plaintiff Chemical 
Leaman Tank Lines, Inc.; ACCIDENT AND CASUALTY COMPANY OF 
WINTERTHUR; ALBA GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD.; ALLIANZ 
CORNHILL INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE PLC, FORMERLY KNOWN AS 
ALLIANZ INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD.; ANGLO-FRENCH 
INSURANCE COMPANY LTD.; ARGONAUT NORTHWEST INSURANCE COMPANY; 
ASSICURAZIONI GENERALI SPA; BALOISE FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY; 
BELLEFONTE INSURANCE COMPANY LTD.; BRITISH NATIONAL LIFE 
INSURANCE SOCIETY LTD.; CNA INTERNATIONAL REINSURANCE CO. 
LTD., FORMERLY KNOWN AS CNA REINSURANCE OF LONDON LTD.; 
DELTA LLOYD NON-LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY; DOMINION INSURANCE 
COMPANY LTD.; DRAKE INSURANCE COMPANY LTD.; EDINBURGH 
INSURANCE COMPANY; EXCESS INSURANCE COMPANY LTD.; FIDELIDADE 
INSURANCE COMPANY; FOLKSAM INTERNATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
(U.K.) LTD.; HELVETIA ACCIDENT SWISS INSURANCE COMPANY; 
INDEMNITY MARINE ASSURANCE COMPANY, LTD.; LEXINGTON INSURANCE 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
                
 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. brought this declaratory 
judgment action in an effort to determine if various policies of 
insurance issued by defendant insurance companies covered the 
cost of environmental cleanup of a waste disposal site it 
maintained in Bridgeport, New Jersey.  Although numerous issues 
are raised on appeal, the primary issue is the appropriate test 
to determine if Chemical Leaman "expected or intended" 
environmental damage.  We hold that, under New Jersey law, the 
appropriate inquiry is the insured's objective intent and that 
the district court erred when it instructed the jury that it must 
determine if Chemical Leaman subjectively "expected or intended" 
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to damage the environment.  Since we determine as a matter of law 
that Chemical Leaman did expect or intend environmental damage as 
of November, 1968, we remand for a new trial to determine 
Chemical Leaman's objective intent during the years remaining in 
question.   
     I. Background 
 A. The Bridgeport Site 
 Chemical Leaman is a tank truck company specializing in the 
transportation of hazardous chemicals including carcinogens.  The 
Bridgeport terminal at issue here was one of many terminals that 
Chemical Leaman maintained across the country.  These terminals 
included facilities where Chemical Leaman would routinely wash 
the trailers that transported the hazardous chemicals after those 
chemicals had been delivered.  The rinse water contaminated with 
residue from the inside of the trailers was disposed of in a 
wastewater treatment system that is at the heart of this law 
suit.  
 The Bridgeport wastewater treatment system consisted of a 
series of unlined ponds dug into the soil to catch and 
purportedly purify the contaminated washwater.  Apparently, the 
designers of this system believed that the sandy bottom of the 
unlined ponds would purify the contaminated rinsewater by acting 
as a kind of natural filter that would strain the impurities from 
the contaminated water as it percolated into the soil.  The 
facility operated in this manner from 1960 to 1975.  It was 
designed and built by Harry Elston, Chemical Leaman's Manager of 
Real Estate and Engineering, in consultation with Edwin Wagner, a 
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professional sanitary engineer with experience in the design of 
waste treatment facilities.  Elston made virtually all of 
Chemical Leaman's decisions regarding waste management and 
disposal. 
 From 1960-62, the wastewater treatment system consisted of a 
series of three unlined settling and percolation ponds, connected 
by "tee pipes."  Elston testified that the depth of the ponds was 
limited to five feet to allow sunlight to enhance the growth of 
aerobic microbes that fed on the trace amounts of chemicals in 
the rinsewater.  This natural process was enhanced by anaerobic 
microbes acting in the ponds and lagoons to biodegrade the 
chemical particulates in the rinsewater.  Gravity separated 
heavier materials from lighter ones in the first pond, and the 
floating contaminants were then periodically skimmed from the top 
of the ponds, and the settled materials were periodically dredged 
from the bottom of the ponds.  The natural processes of aerobic 
and anaerobic microbial biodegradation would break down the trace 
chemical constituents which remained in the rinsewater.  
 A "tee pipe" connected the first and second ponds so as to 
prevent the precipitated and floating materials from passing into 
the second pond.  Thus, only "cleaner" water could reach the 
second pond.  When this rinsewater reached the second pond, the 
retention, phased gravity separation, percolation and microbial 
biodegradation process was repeated.  Only the rinsewater in the 
middle depth of that pond was allowed to flow into the third 
pond.  These processes continued in the third pond, which 
received the "cleanest" water as a result of the processes 
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occurring in the first two ponds.  Elston testified at trial that 
the Bridgeport site was specially selected for its suitability 
for this kind of percolation system. 
 In 1962, Chemical Leaman augmented this system by adding two 
larger aeration lagoons and a final settling lagoon with a 
limestone bed.  Each of these lagoons was designed to replicate 
and enhance the treatment afforded by the original three ponds. 
In addition, the fourth and fifth lagoons were equipped with 
spray aeration devices to increase the oxygen level in the 
lagoons and, thereby, increase aerobic microbial biodegradation 
and evaporation. 
 From the very beginning of this system, the final 
impoundment pond contained an overflow pipe at the top end of the 
berms which fed into an adjacent swamp.  The pipe was apparently 
intended as a safety valve to prevent a rupture in the berms and 
a resulting massive loss of rinsewater in the event of a heavy 
rain.  Between 1960 and 1975, there were repeated discharges of 
treated rinsewater through the overflow pipe to the adjacent 
swamp.  Elston described this discharge as a "trickle," and 
another witness testified that the amount coming out of the 
overflow pipe was usually about a fraction of an inch.  
Nevertheless, a 1970 New Jersey Department of Health sample of 
the swamp water that the rinsewater "trickled" into revealed that 
this trickle was "highly pollutional."  Moreover, by 1974 the 
path of the "trickle" from the last impoundment could "be easily 
seen by looking for a 75 foot wide lane of dead trees" in the 
swamp.       
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 B. The Insurance Policies 
 Chemical Leaman purchased primary comprehensive general 
liability insurance ("CGL") from the Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Company ("Aetna") covering successive years, from April 1, 1959 
through April 1, 1985.0  During this same period of time, the 
London Market Insurers ("LMI") sold Chemical Leaman excess CGL 
coverage.0  Each of the primary and excess policies provided 
coverage (and a duty to defend) only for fortuitous damage, i.e. 
damage that was "neither expected nor intended from the 
standpoint of the insured."  Some of these policies insured 
against an "accident," and others insured against an "occurrence" 
but it is clear that each of these policies covered only 
fortuitous damage, i.e. damage that the insured neither expected 
nor intended. 
   The LMI policies typically stated: 
[s]ubject to the limitations, terms and 
conditions [of the policy] to indemnify the 
Assured for all sums which the Assured shall 
be obligated to pay by reason of the 
liability . . . imposed upon the Assured by 
law, . . . for damages . . . on account of: . 
                     
0
       During trial, Chemical Leaman dismissed its claims 
against the 1981-1985 policies, and the district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of Aetna on the 1959-1960 policy 
because Chemical Leaman had not presented evidence of damage that 
could have triggered this policy.  We need not discuss the 
specific provisions of the Aetna policies since they have 
withdrawn as a party to this appeal.  See infra at    .          
0
       At oral argument before the district court, Chemical 
Leaman dismissed any claims it had against LMI on the policy 
running from April 1, 1985 to April 1, 1986.  Apparently, 
Chemical Leaman dismissed its claims against the 1981-1985 
policies as well.  The LMI do not state what happened in their 
brief, as they say they provided excess coverage from 1960-1981 
and cite to a stipulation in the appendix, but the stipulation 
states they provided coverage from 1958-1986. 
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. . (ii) Property Damage . . . caused by or 
arising out of each occurrence . . . .  
 These policies defined "occurrence" as "[a]n accident or a 
happening or event or a continuous or repeated exposure to 
conditions which unexpectedly and unintentionally results in . . 
. property damage . . . during the policy period."0   
 The policies required that the insured provide written 
notice in the event of an occurrence or accident "as soon as 
practicable."  The policies also provided that the insured shall 
cooperate with the insurer in the defense of a potentially 
coverable claim, suit or proceeding instituted against the 
insured or insurer.     
 Each LMI policy from April 1, 1971 to April 1, 1985, 
contained a pollution exclusion clause.  Because we hold that 
those policies do not insure against the damage that occurred 
after November, 1968, we do not reach any of the issues raised 
under the pollution exclusion clauses.  
     C. Contamination of the Bridgeport Site  
 At the time the Bridgeport facility was built, New Jersey 
prohibited the construction of industrial waste treatment systems 
                     
0
   Some of the LMI's earlier policies insured against an 
"accident," which was circularly defined as "an accident or 
series of accidents arising out of one event or occurrence."  On 
summary judgment, the district court reasoned that New Jersey law 
defines the term "accident" in the accident-based policies in 
substantially the same manner as the definition of an 
"occurrence" in the occurrence-based policies -- an event neither 
expected nor intended by the insured.  See Chemical Leaman Tank 
Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 817 F. Supp. 1136, 1148 
(D.N.J. 1993).  Thus, the court held that Chemical Leaman would 
bear the same standard of proof on the accident policies as it 
would on the occurrence-based policies.  This finding is not 
challenged on appeal. 
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without the approval of the New Jersey Department of Health 
("NJDOH"), and this prohibition was especially applicable to 
treatment facilities discharging effluent into surface and 
underground waters.  See N.J. Rev. Stat. § 58:10-5 (1937) 
(prohibiting pollution of freshwater without Department of Health 
permit) (repealed 1977); N.J. Rev. Stat. §§ 58:11-10, 11-12 
(1937) (requiring Department of Health approval for any change in 
sewage or industrial waste treatment system; owner of such system 
must periodically furnish information required by the department) 
(repealed 1977); N.J. Rev. Stat. §§ 58:12-1, 12-2, 12-3 (1937) 
(prohibiting operation of a plant for the treatment of polluting 
substances from which the effluent is to flow into any waters of 
the states unless approved by Department of Health; "waters of 
the state" include . . . all springs, streams and bodies of 
surface or groundwater) (repealed 1977).   
 Chemical Leaman never obtained the required permits or 
approvals from the State of New Jersey to construct or operate 
the waste water disposal facility at Bridgeport.  However, 
despite Chemical Leaman's failure to get official approval, the 
State of New Jersey learned the Bridgeport site was in operation. 
In March 1961, the New Jersey Division of Fish, Game & Wildlife 
("FGW") received a complaint of a number of dead fish in a pond 
that was fed by swamp water flowing from the direction of the 
Bridgeport facility.  The complaint suggested that Chemical 
Leaman's facility may be responsible.  On September 12, 1961, 
Inspector Walter Robinson of the Pollution Unit of the FGW 
inspected the Bridgeport facility and noticed a discharge into 
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the swamp from the overflow pipe in the last pond.  Robinson had 
observed this discharge on about half of his visits to the 
Bridgeport site, and had concluded in a report dated September 
12, 1961 that "these conditions are not satisfactory." 
Thereafter, Chemical Leaman was asked to stop the discharge.   
 Chemical Leaman responded by agreeing to attempt to purchase 
property to use as a disposal area and to retain a consultant to 
correct this situation.  In return, FGW informed Chemical Leaman 
that FGW expected "all work to be completed and pollution stopped 
by September 1, 1962."  Chemical Leaman's response was the 
construction of the second set of unlined earthen aeration 
lagoons and the final settling lagoon discussed earlier.    
 Inspector Robinson revisited the Bridgeport site on July 31, 
1962, to check on the status of the new treatment system.  His 
progress report noted that while a new spray disposal system had 
been installed in an adjacent field, the area still "has to be 
diked and a new separator has to be installed in the old settling 
ponds."  Although his report noted that the work should be 
completed in six weeks, there is no indication that this work was 
ever completed.  Robinson's "Progress Report" did note that 
effluent was seeping into the ground as intended and not into the 
swamp and that this was "a good indication" that the new 
treatment system was working properly.  However, at trial, 
Robinson testified that he may have thought the pits were lined, 
since "that's the way things were done."  Moreover, Robinson's 
responsibility was limited to preventing discharges to adjacent 
waters that could affect the fish or wildlife in the State of New 
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Jersey.  Thus, seepage into the ground, whether or not 
potentially harmful to the groundwater, or any aspect of the 
environment other than fish and wildlife, was not his concern.0 
 Robinson's initial optimism proved unfounded when, in 
November 1968, water pollution inspectors from the New Jersey 
Department of Health ("NJDOH") again observed a discharge from 
the overflow pipe in the last lagoon.  The NJDOH water pollution 
inspectors concluded that "the waste emanating from the lagoon is 
highly pollutional and [that] immediate measures [sic] be taken 
to eliminate this discharge or to sufficiently treat the waste 
prior to discharge."  The inspectors also concluded that the 
Bridgeport site was operating in violation of State statutes 
since it was discharging an effluent without appropriate 
Departmental approval.  As a result, in February 1969 the NJDOH 
ordered Chemical Leaman to submit plans "concerning the methods 
and operations of a system designed to properly treat the 
effluent of their tank truck washing facility."  In May 1969, 
Chemical Leaman submitted a plan for a new rinse water treatment 
system designed by its own engineering department.  However, 
State regulators rejected this plan as they found the amount of 
remaining chemical residue in the treated rinsewater that would 
be discharged to a nearby stream to be unacceptable.   
                     
0
       Ironically, while assessing Chemical Leaman's proposed 
solution for its pollution problem, Robinson observed one trailer 
being drained directly onto the parking lot.  While such conduct 
was apparently a violation of company policy and would subject 
the individual to disciplinary action, this was not the only 
occasion on which he observed this prohibited conduct.   
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 In February 1970, the NJDOH sampled the waste water in the 
lagoons and found the discharge to be "objectionable." 
Thereafter, State officials again met with Chemical Leaman in an 
unsuccessful attempt to resolve the polluting discharges at the 
Bridgeport site.  Chemical Leaman eventually entered into a 
consent judgment with the New Jersey Department of Environmental 
Protection ("NJDEP") on January 28, 1974, which mandated 
construction of an approved facility by April 1974. Subsequently, 
in 1975, Chemical Leaman fully alleviated its waste water 
disposal problems when Du Pont agreed to take and treat the waste 
water.  
    From November 1968, when water pollution inspectors from 
the NJDOH observed the discharge from the overflow pipe, until 
the summer of 1975, when the contract with Du Pont was entered 
into, some 40 to 50 million gallons of contaminated waste water 
was processed using the same treatment system as modified in 
1962.  Throughout the time the Bridgeport site was in operation 
Chemical Leaman discharged approximately 100 million gallons of 
contaminated waste water into the unlined ponds and lagoons, the 
bottoms of which were only two and a half feet above the 
groundwater.     
 In late 1980, a routine NJDEP survey revealed the existence 
of contaminated groundwater at and around the Bridgeport site.  A 
subsequent investigation disclosed that groundwater beneath the 
terminal was contaminated and that Chemical Leaman's unlined 
ponds and lagoons were the primary source of contamination. 
Thereafter, Chemical Leaman entered into an Administrative 
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Consent Order with the NJDEP to study the scope of the 
groundwater contamination at Bridgeport, and in 1984, the United 
States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") placed the 
Bridgeport Site on the Superfund National Priorities List. 42 
U.S.C. §§ 9605, 9607.0  As an owner and operator of the site, 
Chemical Leaman is strictly liable under CERCLA for the cost of 
the environmental cleanup.  Id.  
 In July 1985 Chemical Leaman entered into a consent decree 
with the EPA based upon a finding that four neighboring wells 
were contaminated, and that three more were threatened.  In that 
decree Chemical Leaman acknowledged liability and agreed to 
undertake a Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study 
("RI/FS") of environmental contamination at the site.  It is this 
CERCLA liability for which Chemical Leaman seeks coverage under 
the policies purchased from the insurers. 
II. Procedural History  
 Chemical Leaman filed a declaratory judgment action in 
district court to determine its right to insurance coverage after 
Aetna and LMI refused to indemnify it for any of the costs of the 
environmental cleanup at the Bridgeport facility.  
 On March 31, 1992, after extensive discovery, the district 
court filed an opinion granting partial summary judgment in favor 
of Chemical Leaman.  See Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. 
Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 788 F. Supp. 846 (D.N.J. 1992).  The 
court held that the "owned property exclusion" contained in the 
                     
0
       42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(1).   
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policies does not bar coverage for the costs of remedial measures 
designed to benefit the ground or surface waters in the vicinity 
of the Bridgeport site.0  
 Subsequently, the district court ruled that genuine issues 
of material fact remained as to whether Chemical Leaman expected 
or intended to cause soil and groundwater damage.  See Chemical 
Leaman Tank Lines, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 817 F. 
Supp. 1136 (D.N.J. 1993).  The district court rejected the 
insurers' argument that Chemical Leaman's objective intent to 
injure the soil and groundwater controlled whether there had been 
an "occurrence" under the insurance policies.  The court also 
relied on Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1255 
(N.J. 1992), to conclude that Chemical Leaman's actions at the 
Bridgeport site were not so "reprehensible" as to require a 
presumption that Chemical Leaman expected or intended to cause 
the groundwater and soil damage.  Instead, the court concluded 
that Chemical Leaman had the burden of proving that it did not 
subjectively intend to cause soil and groundwater damage, and 
that it was not substantially certain that it was causing such 
damage.  
 In ruling upon motions for partial summary judgment, the 
court found that soil and groundwater damage occurred sometime 
during 1960, thus triggering the 1960-61 policies.  The court 
also ruled as a matter of law that soil and groundwater damage 
occurred in the policy year April 1, 1960 to April 1, 1961, but 
                     
0
       The other issues that the district court decided as a 
matter of law are not raised on this appeal.  
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that the continuous trigger doctrine determined whether property 
damage also occurred under the remaining policies.0  Since there 
were disputed issues of fact the court held that the jury would 
have to determine whether injuries occurred during each policy 
period, whether Chemical Leaman subjectively expected or intended 
the injuries, and whether the injuries caused by the use of the 
Bridgeport rinsewater treatment system were of a continuous, 
indivisible nature.  Finally, the court held that Chemical       
Leaman's failure to promptly notify its insurers of its liability 
under CERCLA did not bar recovery under the notice provisions of 
the various insurance policies because the insurers had not been 
prejudiced by the delay. 
   Prior to trial, Chemical Leaman filed a motion in limine to 
bar evidence of environmental problems it had encountered at 
sites other than Bridgeport.  The court granted that motion 
holding that the probative value of the other-site evidence was 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, jury 
confusion, and undue waste of time.  That ruling is also 
challenged on this appeal.  
III. The Jury's Findings 
 After a three week trial, the jury found that Chemical 
Leaman was entitled to coverage under the Aetna and LMI policies 
as follows: the policies in effect from April 1, 1960 to April 1, 
1971 - for costs associated with the remediation of the soil; the 
                     
0
   The time of an "occurrence" is the time when the 
complaining party is damaged.  See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. 
v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 483 A.2d 402, 409 (N.J. 1984).  
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policies in effect from April 1, 1961 to April 1, 1971 - for the 
remediation of the wetlands; and the policies in effect from 
April 1, 1960 to April 1, 1981 - for groundwater remediation. The 
jury also found that Chemical Leaman was entitled to defense 
costs that were incurred after April 18, 1988.  The insurers 
challenge both the court's and jury's findings on appeal.  The 
court instructed the jury that it had to find for Chemical Leaman 
unless it concluded that Chemical Leaman subjectively expected or 
intended to cause the pollution at the Bridgeport site.  This 
charge is at the center of this appeal as the insurers argue that 
the appropriate inquiry is Chemical Leaman's objective 
expectation and intent.  The insurers argue that, viewed 
objectively, the evidence established that the damage at 
Bridgeport was expected and/or intended by Chemical Leaman, and 
that there was therefore no accident or occurrence under the 
various policies. 
 Subsequent to oral argument but prior to our disposition of 
this appeal, Chemical Leaman and Aetna settled all of Chemical 
Leaman's environmental claims against Aetna, including the claims 
involved in this appeal.  In accordance with the settlement 
agreement filed with this court, Aetna withdrew as a party to 
this appeal.  LMI, however, was not a party to that settlement 
agreement.  Therefore, we must still address the issues raised as 
they pertain to LMI.0  
                     
0
   Practically speaking, Aetna's withdrawal from this appeal 
has no effect on the issues which we must address since LMI and 
Aetna joined in each other's arguments. 
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 Although LMI raises numerous issues, our inquiry focuses 
upon whether there has been an "accident" or "occurrence" as 
defined by the CGL policies.0  Following the court's rulings on 
the post-trial motions, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided 
Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 
831 (N.J. 1993).0  We are guided by Morton and Voorhees, supra. 
Our review of the district court's interpretation and prediction 
of New Jersey law is plenary.0  See Wiley v. State Farm Fire & 
Casualty Co., 995 F.2d 457, 459 (3d Cir. 1993).   
 The parties agree that New Jersey law governs this dispute. 
It is also clear that we must apply state law as it exists today, 
even if the law may have changed since the judgment of the 
district court.  See Vandenbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 
U.S. 538, 543 (1941); Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. Hartford 
Accident & Indem. Co., 25 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 1994); National 
Sur. Corp. v. Midland Bank, 551 F.2d 21, 28 (3d Cir. 1977). Thus, 
"intervening and conflicting state court decisions will 
                     
0
   Aetna briefed the "occurrence" issue and LMI joined in and 
incorporated the arguments advanced by Aetna.  See LMI brief at 
50; LMI Reply brief at 1-2.  
0
       The insurers also brought a motion for relief from 
judgment on the grounds of newly discovered evidence pursuant to 
rule 60(b)(2) and/or on grounds of misconduct pursuant to Rule 
60(b)(3).  We need not reach this issue as the insurers will have 
the benefit of the "after discovered" documents at the new trial.  
0
       The district court's subject matter jurisdiction was 
based on diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 
The jurisdiction of this court is founded upon 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
As a Federal Court sitting in diversity we are bound, as was the 
district court, to apply the substantive law of the state whose 
laws govern the action.  See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 
64, 78 (1938); Borse v. Pierce Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611, 
613 (3d Cir. 1992). 
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[necessarily] cause the reversal of judgments which were correct 
when entered."  Baker v. Outboard Marine Corp., 595 F.2d 176, 182 
(3d Cir. 1979) (quoting Vandenbark, 311 U.S. at 543).  However, a 
brief discussion of the evolution of the law in this area will 
focus our analysis.   
IV. New Jersey Law Before Morton. 
 A. Atlantic Employers Ins. Co. v. Tots & Toddlers Pre-  
    School Day Care Center, Inc.0 
 
 In Atlantic Employers, parents of children who had allegedly 
been sexually abused sued the owners and operators of a day care 
center where the abuse purportedly took place.  The company that 
insured the center then brought a declaratory judgment action to 
determine its obligation to defend or indemnify the owners for 
any recovery the plaintiffs might win in their personal injury 
suits based upon negligence and intentional tort.  
 The day care center's insurance policy insured against 
damage resulting from an "occurrence."  An "occurrence" included 
injuries or damage that was "neither expected nor intended by the 
insured."  Atlantic Employers, 571 A.2d at 303.  The policy also 
contained an exclusion for violations of penal statutes or 
ordinances.  The Appellate Division first noted the general rule 
that "coverage does exist . . . 'for the unintended results of an 
intentional act, but not for damages assessed because of an 
injury intended to be inflicted.'"  Id. (citation omitted).  The 
court stated:   
                     
0
       571 A.2d 300 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert. denied, 
584 A.2d 218 (N.J. 1990). 
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There seems to be no dispute that if, . . . 
Robert Knighton sexually molested the 
children, then he had the requisite level of 
intent to be found guilty of sexual 
molestation, based upon the criminal statutes 
of this State.  But appellants insist that 
this does not necessarily mean that he 
intended the damages or injuries incurred by 
the children as a result of such actions. . . 
.  Further, they insist that the existence of 
such intent cannot automatically be imputed 
to the other insureds under the policy so as 
to exclude coverage. . . .  We reject this 
position. 
 
Id.  The court then examined cases from other jurisdictions in 
order to analyze the insureds' argument in context with 
developing law.  The court noted that some jurisdictions employed 
a subjective test in determining insurance coverage under these 
circumstances, and some rely upon an objective test.  The court 
concluded that public policy mandated an objective approach. 
As a matter of public policy and logic we 
conclude that the better rule warrants 
application of the objective approach. A 
subjective test suggests that it is possible 
to molest a child and not cause some kind of 
injury, an unacceptable conclusion. . . .  It 
is simply against public policy to indemnify 
a person for a loss incurred as a result of 
his[/her] own willful wrongdoing. 
 
Id. at 304.   
B. Prudential Property & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Karlinski0 
 Within a year and a half of Atlantic Employers, the 
Appellate Division decided Karlinski.  There, insured's 13 year 
old son (James) had engaged in a prearranged fight with a 14 year 
old (Mark) in which Mark had fallen and suffered a broken hip. 
                     
0
       598 A.2d 918 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991). 
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The court was asked to determine if a homeowner's policy 
obligated the plaintiff insurer to defend and indemnify the 
defendant.  The policy excluded coverage for "'bodily injury . . 
. which is expected or intended by the insured.'"  Karlinski, 598 
A.2d at 919.  The motion court granted the insurer's motion for 
summary judgment noting, that the son of the insured "'instigated 
the fight and threw the first blow and started the fight.  As far 
as I am concerned, it is intentional conduct and the coverage 
doesn't apply.'"  Id.  The motion judge also concluded that "a 
broken 'leg' [Mark actually suffered a broken hip] was not an 
extraordinary consequence of the fight."  Id.   
 On appeal the court aptly noted, "[t]his appeal requires 
that we again explore the frequently visited but still unclearly 
charted area of liability coverage for intentional torts which 
produce unintended results." Id.  The court went on to observe: 
  Our review of New Jersey authorities 
satisfies us that, . . . it is difficult to 
ascertain a clear weight of authority on the 
subject of liability insurance coverage for 
unintended results of intentional acts. 
Differing combinations of variables, such as 
the language of the exclusion clause, the 
nature of the harm and its relationship to 
the intentional act, and the availability of 
relief to the injured party, appear to 
influence the extent to which our decisions 
have inquired into the nature of the intent. 
 
Id. at 921.  The court then stated:  
we hold that, when a coverage exclusion is 
expressed in terms of bodily injury expected 
or intended by the insured, and where the 
intentional act does not have an inherent 
probability of causing the degree of injury 
actually inflicted, a factual inquiry into 
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the actual intent of the actor to cause that 
injury is necessary. 
Id.   
 Thus, after Karlinski, a fact finder did not have to inquire 
into the actual (i.e. subjective) intent of the insured unless 
the damage that resulted from the insured's actions was not 
inherently probable.  Accordingly, absent this improbability of 
harm, the appropriate inquiry was the insured's objective intent. 
 C. Voorhees v. Preferred Mutual Ins. Co.0 
 In Voorhees, a parent was sued for statements she had made 
at a public meeting questioning the competency of her child's 
teacher.  The teacher claimed she had suffered emotional distress 
and mental anguish as a result of the parent's conduct.  The 
teacher alleged that the parent had acted "willfully, 
deliberately, recklessly and negligently," in making false 
accusations that had damaged the teacher professionally, and 
subjected her to public ridicule.  Voorhees, 607 A.2d at 1257. 
Medical evidence established that the emotional distress the 
teacher complained of had resulted in "'an undue amount of 
physical complaints,' including 'headaches, stomach pains, 
nausea, . . . [and] body pains.'"  Id. at 1258.  
 The parent had a homeowner's policy that provided coverage 
for liability arising from "bodily injury" caused by an 
"occurrence."  The policy defined an "occurrence" as an 
"accident," and excluded coverage for bodily injury intentionally 
caused by the insured.  The insurer relied upon this language and 
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       607 A.2d 1255 (N.J. 1992). 
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refused to defend the insured against the teacher's suit, 
asserting that the claims were based on the insured's intentional 
act and that the complaint sought damages for a "personal" rather 
than a "bodily" injury.  The parent eventually sued her carrier 
for damages resulting from its refusal to provide a defense and 
indemnify her.  Both parties moved for summary judgment. 
 The trial court granted the insurer's motion ruling that the 
complaint did not allege the kind of "bodily injury" that would 
be covered under the policy.  A divided panel of the Appellate 
division reversed. 
 The New Jersey Supreme Court noted that the duty to defend 
under the policy was not triggered "absent a potentially-
coverable occurrence."  Id. at 1262.  In assessing whether the 
insured's statements constituted a potentially coverable 
occurrence, the court first held that "the accidental nature of 
an occurrence is determined by analyzing whether the alleged 
wrongdoer intended or expected to cause an injury."  Id. at 1264. 
As to what constitutes an "intent to injure," the court noted 
that the general trend in the law appeared to require an inquiry 
into the actor's subjective intent to cause injury.   
  We adhere to the prevalent New Jersey rule 
and hold that the accidental nature of an 
occurrence is determined by analyzing whether 
the alleged wrongdoer intended or expected to 
cause an injury.  If not, then the resulting 
injury is "accidental," even if the act that 
caused the injury was intentional.  That 
interpretation prevents those who 
intentionally cause harm from unjustly 
benefitting from insurance coverage while 
providing injured victims with the greatest 
chance of compensation consistent with the 
need to deter wrong-doing.  It also accords 
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with an insured's objectively-reasonable 
expectation of coverage for 
unintentionally-caused harm. 
  Even if the operative question is the 
intent to injure rather than to act, the 
question of what constitutes an "intent to 
injure" remains.  The key issue is whether 
the court must find a subjective intent to 
injure, or whether it can presume an intent 
to injure from the objective circumstances. 
In that regard, our inquiry parallels that 
taken in interpreting policy exclusions for 
intentional acts.  Those exclusions preclude 
coverage for injuries expected or intended by 
the insured.  Case law interpreting those 
policy exclusions, in addition to that 
interpreting the definition of "occurrence," 
is thus relevant. 
  The general trend appears to require an 
inquiry into the actor's subjective intent to 
cause injury.  Even when the actions in 
question seem foolhardy and reckless, the 
courts have mandated an inquiry into the 
actor's subjective intent to cause injury. 
 
Id. at 1264. 
 However, the court recognized that: 
[w]hen the actions are particularly 
reprehensible, the intent to injure can be 
presumed from the act without an inquiry into 
the actor's subjective intent to injure. That 
objective approach focuses on the likelihood 
that an injury will result from an actor's 
behavior rather than on the wrongdoer's 
subjective state of mind. 
Id. at 1265 (citing Atlantic Employers, supra).  The Voorhees 
court reasoned that the insured's actions were a far cry from the 
type of egregious behavior that justified an objective approach 
in Atlantic Employers.  The court held that "[a]bsent exceptional 
circumstances that objectively establish the insured's intent to 
injure," the insured's subjective intent to injure must govern. 
Id.  While the court felt that there was little evidence that the 
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insured subjectively intended or expected to injure the teacher, 
the court never had to address this question because the 
plaintiff had also alleged that the insured had acted 
negligently.  The allegation of negligence presupposed the 
absence of a subjective intent to injure and stated a claim for a 
potentially coverable occurrence thus triggering the insurer's 
duty to defend.  See id.  Accordingly, the court affirmed 
plaintiff's award of summary judgment.    
 D. SL Industries, Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co.0 
 In SL Industries, an employee had filed suit against his 
employer alleging age discrimination and common law fraud as a 
result of the employer eliminating his position.  The employee 
sought recovery for the alleged bodily injury that resulted.  The 
employer was insured under a policy in which the insurer agreed 
to defend and indemnify the employer for all sums resulting from 
a bodily injury caused by an "occurrence."  "Occurrence" was 
defined as an "accident . . . which results in bodily injury . . 
. neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the 
insured."  SL Industries, 607 A.2d at 1269-70. 
 The employer settled the suit and then brought a declaratory 
judgment action against its insurer to establish its right to 
indemnification.  The Law Division granted the insurer summary 
judgment, but the Appellate Division reversed, holding that 
although intended harm was not covered under the policy, the 
policy did provide coverage for the unforeseen results of 
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26 
intentional conduct.  The court then remanded the case to the Law 
Division to determine whether the employee's emotional distress 
had been intended or whether it was foreseeable.  
 On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court had to determine if 
the general intent to injure that is inherent in a claim of fraud 
necessarily incorporates the intent to cause the specific injury 
(emotional distress), or whether proof of a subjective intent to 
cause the specific injury is required.  Id. at 1277-1279.  The 
court began its analysis of the required intent by examining the 
differing approaches taken by earlier cases.         
  Our courts have taken different approaches 
to the question of how specifically the 
insured must have intended the resulting 
injury.  Employing the "Lyons" test some 
courts have held that a subjective intent to 
injure ends the inquiry and precludes 
coverage.  Under that approach, if there is a 
subjective intent to injure then any injury 
that results from the action will be deemed 
"intentional," even if the injury is 
different from or greater than that intended. 
. . .
0
 
  On the other hand, some courts have 
indicated that to preclude coverage if the 
injury that actually occurred was not a 
probable outcome of the wrongful act is 
unfair. [citing Prudential Property & 
Casualty Ins. Co. v. Karlinski] . . . . 
However, in those circumstances in which the 
facts indicate that the acts in which the 
insured engaged were unlikely to result in 
the degree or type of injury that in fact 
occurred, an inquiry into the subjective 
intent to cause the resulting injury is in 
order. 
  A third approach is even more likely to 
lead to coverage.  In Hanover Ins. Group v. 
Cameron, the court rejected the insurance 
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       The test derives its name from Lyons v. Hartford Ins. 
Group, 310 A.2d 485, 488-89 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973). 
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company's argument that to preclude coverage 
only the intent to harm need be demonstrated. 
The court indicated that "intent" would only 
be found when the actual consequences that 
resulted from the act were intended, or when 
the actor was substantially certain they 
would result.  
  To determine which approach to adopt, we 
refer to the general principles underlying 
the interpretation of insurance-policy 
provisions involving intentional conduct.   
  The Lyons test . . . precludes coverage in 
some cases in which an insured could 
reasonably expect coverage.  When the injury 
caused significantly exceeds the injury 
intended or expected and is an improbable 
consequence of the wrongful act that caused 
it, then it is hard to characterize the 
injury as truly "intentional."  The injury, 
from the standpoint of the insured, is 
"accidental," and could thus be deemed an 
occurrence.  Moreover, if the tortfeasor did 
not intend or expect to cause the resulting 
harm, denying coverage will not deter the 
harmful conduct.  In that case, there is no 
policy justification for denying the victim 
the possibility of additional compensation. 
As the Karlinski court noted, precluding 
coverage "even if the actual harm far 
exceed[s] the consequences which might 
reasonably be expected by the insured . . . 
diminishes the injured party's realistic 
possibility of recovery more than it impacts 
upon the insured tortfeasor."  
  On the other hand, an approach allowing 
coverage whenever the adverse consequences 
intended by the tortfeasor did not precisely 
match the actual consequences of their 
wrongful actions undermines the basic policy 
against indemnifying wrongdoers. 
  We believe the Karlinski test presents the 
most reasonable approach. . . .  Assuming the 
wrongdoer subjectively intends or expects to 
cause some sort of injury, that intent will 
generally preclude coverage.  If there is 
evidence that the extent of the injuries was 
improbable, however, then the court must 
inquire as to whether the insured 
subjectively intended or expected to cause 
that injury.  Lacking that intent, the injury 
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was "accidental" and coverage will be 
provided. 
                                               
Id. at 1277-78 (citations omitted). 
 Accordingly, the court affirmed the Appellate Division's 
judgment remanding the case to the Law Division to determine 
whether the employee's emotional distress had been a probable 
outcome of the insured's general intent to injure, and if not, 
whether the insured subjectively had intended to cause the 
employee's actual injuries.  See id. at 1279.       
 V. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co.0          
 In Morton, the New Jersey Supreme Court had to apply the 
evolving law of occurrence based insurance policies to injuries 
to the environment.  There, the insured, Morton International, 
sue_" 
                     
0
       629 A.2d 831 (N.J. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 2764 
(1994). 
 
